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The Olive Branch and the Hammer:  
A Strategic Analysis of Hawala in the Financial 
War on Terrorism 
Daniel A. Hancock1 
 
 
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. counter-terror efforts to disrupt al Qa’ida’s 
finances have been imprecise at best; at worst, they have had profound negative 
effects.  The question of why hawala poses such a great threat and why there is a 
need for strict regulation or elimination of hawala has been the subject of great 
deliberation among policy makers and financial scholars since al Qa’ida’s attack 
on New York and Washington, D.C.  Regardless, strategic banter became policy 
with the publishing of Executive Order (EO) 13224 which greatly expanded the 
U.S.’s ability to freeze, block and disrupt the transfer and storage of terrorist 
funds.2   In the aftermath of 9/11, this executive order set the tone and direction 
for U.S. strategy to disrupt and infiltrate al Qa’ida’s financial network.  EO 13224 
created the framework for further debate that continues today.  The debate is 
driven by the underlying assumption of policy makers that hawala was a 
fundamental piece of al Qa’ida’s financial repertoire, allowing al Qa’ida to 
finance its global operations, particularly the 9/11 attack on America.  The roots 
of this false assumption are in myth and post 9/11 histrionics. 
 
A prevailing school of thought argues that regulation of hawala needs to be 
tempered with patience, regional collaboration, socio-economic and cultural 
sensitivity, and broader formal financial reform.  Efforts to date by the U.S. 
government and international community have been too aggressive and have not 
achieved their stated objectives.  Hastily made recommendations and regulation 
will not benefit the U.S. in its long-term efforts to defeat al Qa’ida.  This school of 
thought encompasses Maimbo, Thompson, Passas, and Sharma – all referenced 
throughout this paper. 
                                                 
1 LT Hancock is Surface Warfare Officer in the US Navy.  A native of Augusta, Georgia, he is a 2002 graduate of the 
United States Naval Academy and a 2008 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, receiving a Master of Arts in 
Security Studies (Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia).  Upon graduation from NPS he was designated by the 
Navy as a political-military affairs specialist for the Middle East.  He is currently studying Arabic at the Defense 
Language Institute. 
2 Department of the Treasury, Contributions by the Department of Treasury to the Financial War on Terrorism Fact Sheet, 
(Washington, D.C: Treasury Department, 2002). 
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By conducting a detailed analysis of hawala in Afghanistan from 2001-2006 this 
paper attempts to prove that hawala, as a component of the war on financial 
terror, is not a strategic threat.  Furthermore, this paper attempts to show that 
most broad regulation has been ineffective, and in fact counter-productive, 
alienating scores of innocent Muslims and galvanizing regional support away 
from U.S. foreign policy while pushing Muslim sympathies toward al Qa’ida.  
The incongruence of American foreign policy in the financial “war on terror” has 
been damaging.  America has extended the olive branch to the Muslim world in 
rhetoric while wielding a deadly financial hammer. 
 
Financial Terrorism in Afghanistan: Background Issues  
Hawala in Afghanistan has always played an important role in the financial 
sector, but especially in recent decades.  Samuel Maimbo, a noted hawala scholar 
for the World Bank explains that because of decades of conflict Afghanistan’s 
formal sector is practically non-existent.3   During this period of turmoil, hawala 
filled a necessary role left void because of the financial sector’s inability to meet 
basic financial service needs of the Afghan people.  
 
Until the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the informal sector, namely hawala, was the 
only reliable service in play.  While formal financial institutions were non-
existent or incapacitated by sanctions and war, hawala provided a cheap, 
efficient, and cost-effective alternative that could be trusted by the Afghan 
people.4  In the absence of an internationally recognized and legitimate 
government, the informal hawala sector’s hawaladars, or money service 
providers, became “key economic agents”5 in Afghanistan.  While the formal 
financial sector has seen growth and improvement since 2001, the hawala 
network still remains a central cog in the financial networks of Afghanistan. 
 
Mapping Hawala: The Scope and Extent of Afghanistan’s Hawala System 
Size: 
The magnitude of hawala’s footprint in Afghanistan is colossal.  The World Bank 
estimates that a whopping 80-90% of all economic activity in Afghanistan is in 
the informal sector.6   With hawala in many instances serving as the only viable 
financial medium in Afghanistan, it seems highly likely that some terror funds 
                                                 
3 Samuel M. Maimbo, “The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan”, World 
Bank Working Paper No. 13, 2003. 
4 Maimbo (2003), 1. 
5 Edwina A. Thompson, “The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: 
Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter Narcotics Policy, ed. Doris Buddenberg and William A. 
Byrd (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2006), 155. 
6 Ibid., 155. 
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are in the hawala system alongside completely licit funds.  The cultural precision 
required to pinpoint illicit activity though, seemed lost on policy makers in the 
U.S. government who settled on a more heavy-handed approach to hawala after 
9/11.7  Al Qa’ida used hawala for the same reasons that hundreds of NGOs and 
international aid organizations did - there was no dependable alternative.8 
 
Surprisingly, with 80-90% of the entire Afghan economy generated from one 
sector, there are only a few hundred hawaladars that operate the entire hawala 
network. There have been two significant studies that help us sketch the size and 
numbers of the hawaladars and hawala markets in Afghanistan.  Maimbo’s 
seminal effort to hawala literature that focuses on the money dealers of Kabul 
estimates that there are 300 registered hawaladars in Kabul and 500-2000 total 
throughout Afghanistan.9   Edwina Thompson, in her cogent contribution to the 
study of the opium problem in Afghanistan, places the number of significant 
shops in the country at 900.10  Finally, based off 2004 interviews conducted in 
Afghanistan by the Treasury Department, the number of hawaladars is estimated 
to be slightly over 300 in the Kabul Money Exchange, and potentially 100-300 
additional dealers scattered in each region to service each of Afghanistan’s thirty-
four provinces.11  Whatever the exact number, it is clear that a relatively few 
hawaladars control a vast and powerful financial network.  
 
Volume 
The amount of money flowing through the hawala network is tremendous.  
Maimbo elaborates:   By some accounts, NGOs alone have pushed hundreds of 
millions through Afghanistan’s hawala system.12  While typical international 
transactions are in the U.S. $100,000 - $200,000 range, single transactions between 
major financial centers such as Kabul and Peshawar in excess of U.S. $500,000, or 
even U.S. $1,000,000 transactions by international organizations are not unusual.  
However, internal transactions tend to be in the U.S. $10,000 – $20,000 range.13 
 
The overall volume of money in the hawala market in Afghanistan is difficult to 
determine with any certainty.  Due to the informal nature and general secrecy of 
hawala, “any estimate of the overall size of the hawala market in Afghanistan 
                                                 
7 This is discussed in more depth in the author’s full thesis of the same title published by Naval Postgraduate School in 
May 2008. 
8 Greenburg et al, 25. 
9 Maimbo (2003), 3. 
10 Thompson, 156. 
11 These figures were based on conversations by Treasury officials with Afghans staffed in the Supervision Department of 
the Central Bank as well as with several Money Exchange Dealers in the Kabul Hawala market. 
12 Maimbo, 4. 
13 Ibid. 
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should however be viewed with extreme caution.”14   Nonetheless, Thompson 
provides a healthy estimate of what Afghan hawala flows look like.  By her 
accounts, 2004-05 aggregate hawala flows in and out of the hawala system were 
between 5.6 – 6.1 billion dollars.15  Hawala, while informal, finances and moves 
billions of dollars in and out of Afghanistan.  It is an impressive feat considering 
the system relies solely on good business practices and self-regulation among its 
hawaladars. 
 
Table 1. Rough Estimates of Aggregate Hawala Flows in Afghanistan from 
2004-2005 (From the United Nations and Thompson) 
 
Hawala Myths 
One of the more populated myths in the barrage of post 9/11 hysteria and media 
scrutiny of hawala is the reported statement that hawala transactions are 
paperless, with hawaladars keeping little if any record of transactions. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, hawaladars’ record-keeping and accounting activities 
appear amazingly robust and professional.  Hawaladars are careful to record 
currencies traded, international pricing of currencies, deposit balances, debit and 
credit balances of partner dealers and all customers, all lending transactions, cash 
                                                 
14 Thompson, 160. 
15 Ibid, 161. 
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on hand, all foreign exchange positions, and customer receipts.16   Though only 
anecdotal, one investigator offered further evidence of the meticulous record-
keeping when he noted that after striking a rapport with a hawaladar in the 
Kabul Exchange, the dealer opened his books to show detailed records of every 
transaction for the past 20 years.  Maimbo’s research also affirmed the findings of 
the Treasury Department that most hawaladars could account for every 
transaction by a variety of means.17  
  
International Organizations18 
Due to the lack of formal financial institutions and the unreliability of those in 
place, hawala was the preferred method of funds delivery for international aid 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the war-torn 
Taliban era; it continues to be so today. The formal sector provides little options, 
and aside from carrying small sums of cash for basic operating costs, 
international organizations are forced to use hawala to send substantial amounts 
of money.  Consequently, it is the only viable option.19   Under the Taliban, 
international users had one or two designated hawaladars that they could deal 
with, but now there is considerable competition between many hawaladars 
offering more competitive, cheaper, and highly reliable financial services into 
and out of Afghanistan.20 
 
As of 2003, there were 127 international and 467 local NGOs operating in 
Afghanistan.  It is estimated that in excess of U.S. $200 million was sent through 
the hawala system in the first year after the Taliban government collapsed.  
Furthermore, in the more rural areas where much of the aid money is 
desperately needed there is no formal alternative to hawala.21   There are some 
formal banks that solicit business from NGOs, but they tend to be “laboriously 
slow.”22   Ultimately, the advantage of hawala over any formal financial entity is 
its long-stretch (it can reach the most rural areas of Afghanistan) and that it 
“provides NGOs with liquidity they otherwise might not have.”23 
 
                                                 
16 Amit Sharma, Remarks given at the Naval Postgraduate School July 31, 2007. Sharma works for the Department of 
Treasury as the Senior Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and has previously conducted analysis of hawala 
while working in the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 
17 Maimbo (2003), 7. 
18 For a more detailed description and examples of typical NGO/international aid organization transactions through 
hawala, see Maimbo’s 2003 study full report. 
19 Maimbo, 11. 
20 Ibid. 




Mapping the Formal Financial Sector 
Afghanistan’s formal financial sector reflects a weak history.  During the 
Taliban’s rule, only six licensed banks existed; none providing commercial 
services or the ability to facilitate international remittances.24   Since the fall of 
the Taliban regime, more strict financial institutions are forming in Afghanistan, 
but are still lacking in services.  “Like everything else in Afghanistan, the form
financial services are underdeveloped.”
al 
                                                
25   As of October 2005, there were 13 
licensed banks open for business in Kabul.26   New banks such as National Bank 
of Pakistan, Habib Bank, and Punjab National Bank of India are all conducting 
business in Afghanistan now.  Despite the slow emergence of major international 
and regional banks, the banking system “is best described as 
embryonic.”27  Years of conflict decimated the functionality of Afghanistan’s 
formal banking services.  
 
Only Da Afghanistan Bank, the central bank of Afghanistan maintained some 
limited functional role during this time.28   Despite the slowly increasing number 
of services and banks available, the overall effect of the financial sector at the 
moment is limited.  What little improvement in capacity or availability of service 
is restricted to Kabul.  Regional and provincial access to formal financial services 
is not readily available.  Even in Kabul, practical access for the layman is 
problematic: to use an ATM at Afghanistan’s leading foreign bank requires you 
to run the gauntlet of a street known as Sniper Alley, then be patted down by a 
bristling security detail of Gurkhas before getting access to a cash machine that 
might or might not be functioning.29   
 
One of the chief reasons for the limited interaction with the formal sector is the 
physical location.  Formal financial institutions are nowhere near the bazaars and 
markets where Afghan hawaladars operate; thus impractical for them to utilize 
formal banks. 
 
The Dark Triangle: Hawala, Drugs, and Terror 
Amit Sharma believes, “the presence of a burgeoning opium economy and 
 
24 Samuel M. Maimbo, “The Challenges of Regulating and Supervising the Hawaladars of Kabul,” in Rural Finance in 
Afghanistan: The Challenge of the Opium Economy: Report on a Two-Day Workshop, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 13-
14, 2004, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 54. 
25 “Everything to Play For,” Foreign Direct Investment Magazine, June 07, 2005. 
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/printpage/php/aid/1288/Everything_to_play_for.html (accessed April 3, 2007). 
26 Thompson, 157. 
27 Foreign Direct Investment, 2005. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Eric Ellis, “Afghanistan Gets Back to Business,” E-Ariana (September 6, 2006), http://www.e-
ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/ (Accessed April 2007). 
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terrorism in Afghanistan provides for considerable risk to the hawala system.”30   
As the insurgency has grown in recent years alongside the booming opium 
crops, a nexus has emerged between drugs and terror.  This nexus occurs in the 
informal hawala network that helps conceal the financial movements of both 
illicit industries.  While Thompson provides a lengthy and superb analysis of 
every region in Afghanistan and its hawala connections with the drug economy, 
pursuant to the goals of this paper, this section will focus on her analysis of the 
provinces and regions in the heart of the Pashtun belt.  It is the hypothesis of this 
author that there is a direct correlation between the intensity of 
terrorist/insurgent activities in certain areas and the intensity of hawala drug-
related transactions in these same areas that are well-documented by Thompson. 
 
Helmand and Qandahar are located in the heart of Pashtun country that 
stretches across the border into Pakistan.  These provinces are “ideally placed to 
exploit the extensive Pashtun trading networks that reach many of the world’s 
key financial sites.”  As one saraf, or hawaladar, described the nature of the 
relationship between Helmand (and Hilmand) and Qandahar, “you may as well 
see them as one and the same market.”31  The same holds true for the areas on 
the other side of the border.  Just as Helmand and Qandahar are one Pashtun 
economy with tight interdependence, so are the cross-border economies and 
social ties with the Pashtuns in Pakistan.  It is one network, one economy, and 
one kindred cultural perspective. 
 
Because of Qandahar’s strategic location in Pashtun country it is “an important 
site to explore the links between the informal hawala networks and the 
trafficking of drugs.”32   If hawala is being exploited for the concealed movement 
of illicit drug funds, it seems reasonable to assume that it is being exploited in a 
similar fashion and with similar intensity by insurgents and terrorists.  Helmand, 
too, boasts similar pre-conditions for abuse of its hawala network. 
 
Thompson does not map out this area of the Afghanistan hawala network, but 
provides solid basis for further investigation.   She does, however, highlight that 
there are 54 hawaladars in Qandahar and Helmand that specialize in drug 
transactions.33   Furthermore, her study estimates that in both Qandahar and 
Helmand drug funds account for 80-90% of all hawala funds.34   Sharma, a 
Treasury Department official who has spent time in Afghanistan investigating 
the hawala system and financial reform there, offers this conclusion: 
                                                 
30 Amit Sharma, Remarks made at the Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
31 Thompson, 170. 
32 Ibid., 176. 
33 Ibid., 177. 
34 Ibid, 156. 
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The broad answer is, yes folks (hawaladars) agreed that they did 
‘know’ their customers, and therefore did indeed know much of the 
time what the business they were facilitating included… that said, 
everyone I spoke with did admit that facilitating terror (and other 
illicit activity for that matter) was not a good thing, and that they did 
want to find solutions that they could shove out this business but do 
so in a way that still retained their access to the larger pool of funds 
and the market…. I do think there is a distinction drawn between 
facilitating narcotics and terrorism – absolutely – and we need to 
remember that financially facilitating some of the drug trade is 
interpreted different ways… especially if some count their livelihood 
that way.35 
 
The nexus between drugs and hawala is palpable.  The more difficult connection 
is the third leg of this triangle: terror.  Accepting Thompson’s data is accurate, or 
as close to fact as one can get in the inherently recluse and informal hawala 
network of Afghanistan, one must next examine the interplay of terror in 
hawala.  The UN data shows the richest poppy cultivation in the volatile 
southern provinces of Helmand and Qandahar, as well as a few eastern and 
north-eastern provinces.  The connection between drugs and terror, and 
implicitly hawala, come into focus in U.S. Central Command’s data on 2006 
coalition forces attacks during the months leading up to harvest in the 
aforementioned drug provinces.  Insurgent and terrorist activities in Helmand, 
Qandahar and the eastern, northeastern provinces are highest during the peak 
drug months of early 2006.  There seems an obvious direct connection between 
the two, and likewise, given the exposed abuse by drug-specialist hawaladars in 
these provinces and the researched data showing extremely high percentages of 
overall hawala drug-related activity in Helmand and Qandahar, an equally 
apparent connection of the two with hawala.  It is unlikely that there are as many 
actors involved either as terror hawaladars or terrorist/insurgents actors in 
general due to the nature of terrorism and its high risk and low financial reward.  
Still, even if the number of hawaladars involved is fewer, there is a high 
probability of correlation to the intensity of hawala drug transactions in 
Afghanistan’s volatile southern provinces. 
 
The drug and terror networks are more duplicitous than imagined.  They appear 
to be one convergent network with tactical differences but complimentary 
strategic outlooks.  In many cases, they may be exactly the same.  Certainly, it 
appears probable that the hawaladars that service both the drug and terror 
industries are the same, though further field research is desired to verify this 
                                                 
35 Amit Sharma, Email message to the author, November 1, 2007. 
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hypothesis.  It is reasonable to assume that a hawaladar that bears the risk of 
dealing with drugs might also be tempted by the allure of terror financing.  It is 
probably more certain that hawaladars that deal with terrorist transactions 
initially also deal with drugs if given the opportunity.  The final point is the rich 
Pashtun interdependence that sweeps into Pakistan provides policymakers and 
regulators with a difficult context in which to begin deciphering the tightly 
woven nexus of Afghanistan’s black triangle. 
 
 




























Regulatory and Reform Models: The Way Forward 
Current Models 
In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent international 
efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, abstaining 
from regulation or supervision of the informal financial system is no longer a 
tenable option.36  Given the intense interest and focus on the hawala system of 
the Middle East and Islamic world post 9/11, some measure of oversight or 
regulation is required.  One can make a strong case that no regulation is needed 
whatsoever, but given the political climate, such a position is politically 
unsustainable.  Within this framework several regulatory models are on the 
table, several have been enacted at the behest of the U.S. government and 
international coalition, and others have suggested strategic guidelines that map 
out best practices to maximize the benefit of hawala while curbing the illicit 
components.  The most critical aspect of any regulation, though, must consider 
the unique characteristics of Afghanistan’s financial system and people.  Hawala 
in the U.A.E. is not hawala in Pakistan.  Hawala in Pakistan is not hawala in 
Afghanistan.  Hawala in Afghanistan is not hawala in the U.A.E..  Blunt 
regulatory tools37  and policy cannot be universally applied to the many people 
who utilize hawala.  It is culturally naive to do so, and unrealistic to expect the 
people of Afghanistan to wrap their arms around a policy better suited for 
Pakistan or maybe Indonesia. 
 
In Maimbo’s field research, many hawaladars did make passionate arguments 
against any regulation.  Four main points emerged in this argument:  First, 
hawaladars are difficult to identify for regulation.  Some are only hawaladars, 
but others operate as hawaladars in addition to being a butcher, or running a 
market store.  Second, there is no incentive to open themselves up as a business 
community to external regulation.  Hawaladars fear the big stick approach 
shown by regulators in the al Barakaat38 debacle in Somalia.  Third, hawala 
transactions are varied and would be difficult to develop a regulatory pattern.  
Lastly, even if sound regulations were feasible, DAB absolutely lacks the capacity 
to enforce anything.39  For the hawaladars, regulation appears wrought with 
danger and low in reward.  From the government perspective, Afghanistan 
needs to focus its immediate attention elsewhere first.  Hawala regulation seems 
                                                 
36 Maimbo (2003), 16. 
37 Specifics of U.S. regulatory policy and the FATF special recommendations on terror financing are discussed in-depth in 
a separate chapter. 
38 Al barakaat was a major hawala firm in Somalia handling hundreds of millions of dollars. It served as the only 
functioning financial medium between Somalia to the outside world. After 9/11 al barakaat was hammered by the US 
Treasury Department for alleged terrorist financing but the 9/11 commission ultimately concluded there was no 
connection. To date, no convictions have occurred in this case, but the company was largely destroyed by the process. 
39 Maimbo (2003), 16. 
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less urgent by comparison to the scope of everything that needs to be overhauled 
financially in Afghanistan.40 
 
What does work in Afghanistan is self-regulation.  The hawaladars of Kabul 
have been self-regulating without any oversight since 1930.41  There are over 300 
self-regulating hawaladars in the Kabul Money Exchange.  The Kabul 
hawaladars even serve under an executive committee “responsible for enforcing 
the tacit rules and business codes of the market; code violations bring serious 
consequences.  The executive committee is also responsible for the amicable 
settlement of disputes.”42   Self-regulation is a viable option because the 
hawaladars are better able to identify the problems within hawala and deal with 
them more effectively than any external regulators ever could.  If hawaladar 
input was solicited in the right way, hawaladars might have a more vested 
interest in the rules and regulations imposed (since they created them) and this 
might narrow the gap between the formal financial world (and government) and 
the hawala system.43  Self-regulation allows for a more realistic approach to 
effective regulation than that from the FATF or central bank which is largely seen 
as meddling or external interference in legitimate business. 
 
Another option on the table is a hybrid model aimed at creating transparency 
without sacrificing the allure of hawala’s inexpensiveness, efficiency, and reach.  
In an incremental process, carefully choreographed with the help of the 
hawaladars themselves, hawaladars would be asked to register (not license), 
identify customers carefully to include physical address, bear the responsibility 
of suspicious activity reports, and when necessary, facilitate investigations.44 
 
Challenges to Reform 
Hawala is ingrained in the cultural and religious landscape of Afghanistan.  It is 
part of daily life.  “The market has such a long history of operational and 
regulatory independence that external oversight is unlikely to be easily 
welcomed - especially if it is overly burdensome.”45   Afghanistan, a state 
plagued by the great game and other imperial interferences does not want 
external or western policies forced on them.  This is the first challenge.  Afghans 
simply prefer hawala.  It is a subtle but important point; this is what the people 
want. While not exclusive to Muslims, hawala is sanctioned by sharia law and is 
synonymous with Islamic banking.  It is a cultural aspect of Islam that can be 
 
40 Maimbo, 16-17. 
41 Maimbo (2005), 57. 
42 Maimbo (2003), 17. 
43 Ibid., 17. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Maimbo (2005), 58. 
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traced back to the Prophet Mohammed, himself a trader and user of the informal 
economy. 
 
Literacy is another impediment to hawala reform or acceptance of regulation.  
Broad FATF regulations not adapted to Afghanistan miss the mark and alienate 
the population.  74% of Afghans and 91% of women are illiterate and most have 
no formal identification.46  This social condition is a disabling pre-text for the 
transfer of hawala informal economy to the formal sector.  It is unrealistic and 
ignorant to expect Afghans to embrace rules better suited for a U.S. state.  
Western corporate procedures and business plans, formal accounting, and other 
reform ideas that are being incorporated by U.S.AID (United States Agency for 
International Development) and the World Bank are unlikely to succeed given 
the underlying illiteracy problem in Afghanistan.  Delawari is pushing 
universities to offer courses on business, accounting, and financial literacy, but 
this is a long-term problem with a slow process toward improvement.  In the 
meanwhile, it is a huge obstacle to reform. 
 
Perhaps the most glaring error in policy and hindrance to hawala regulation or 
reform is the lack of input received from hawaladars, or rather the lack soliciting 
of hawaladars by policy makers.  Every expert from Wilson to Thompson to 
Passas to Maimbo has suggested what is plain to see; the first step in any serious 
discussion of moving forward should be to co-opt the hawaladars of 
Afghanistan, namely the executive committee of Kabul’s market.  Yet, six years 
after 9/11, this has not genuinely happened.  While the U.S. Treasury 
Department and the DAB will almost certainly say that hawaladars have been 
engaged in the reform process, including the most recent round of laws 
concerning money-dealers and foreign exchange dealers, research shows this 
engagement to be merely transitory.  Commenting on the Treasury Department’s 
own mission to Kabul in 2004, Sharma found that most hawaladars felt that even 
when DAB conducted open forums with the hawaladars, the sticky points of 
regulation were already decreed and the DAB was just there to tell them the new 
policy rather than ask their opinion.47 
 
Whether or not it is reality, the perception among hawaladars is certainly one of 
alienation and exclusion from the reform process by the government.  
Hawaladars have a preset suspicion of authority.  “Collaboration with 
government regulators requires a profound social and psychological stretch for 
 
46 Thompson, 186. 
47 Amit Sharma, Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
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those who run the networks.”48  The mistrust of the formal sector and adversarial 
standing between hawaladars and government regulators creates an inherent 
problem.  There is no strong inclination for hawaladars to emerge from the 
shadows, much less be dragged out by their feet. 
Finally, hawaladars acknowledge that there are certainly illicit funds facilitated 
through their hawala system.  However, as individual hawaladars, they would 
not stem the flow - there is too much at stake.49  In a business environment run 
on honor, interdependent peer relationships, and tacit rules, one cannot venture 
off the beaten path without consent.  The risk of being black-listed or cut out of 
the business partnerships required to conduct transactions is too great.  There is 
great fear among hawaladars that cooperation in driving out illicit funds would 
be disclosed (back to the issue of general mistrust of the central government) and 
financially ruin their own business due to the interdependent nature of hawala. 
 
Afghanistan: Policy Missteps and the Cultural Fallout 
The U.S. Treasury Department has totally failed to see social and cultural 
realities on the ground.  Ironically, the Bush Administration found out the hard 
way that they had to rely on the same hawala network terrorists use to move 
money in Afghanistan to get anything done after the Taliban fell.  A little 
historical perspective can go a long way.  This sort of improper framing of the 
issue has plagued U.S. foreign policy and certainly its approach to hawala. 
 
“During the decades of conflict, trust in the government was progressively 
eroded and transposed to kinship, ethnic, and other social connections.”50  The 
gravitational pull of these ties is forceful.  These social and ethnic ties bind the 
Afghan people, not the central government.  It is in these contexts that the 
Afghan people want to conduct their business, not under the perceived 
interference of Kabul or the U.S. Treasury Department’s regulations.  
“Afghanistan’s political economy is so deeply constituted through regional and 
international associations that it would be a mistake to view it in a purely 
national context.”51  Yet that is exactly what the U.S. is attempting to do through 
FATF regulations and DAB laws.  
 
Afghanistan is not hopeless.  The government of Afghanistan is doing many 
things right.  Formal sector reforms are moving nicely.  However, any reform or 
regulation of the hawala sector must be done slowly and cautiously.  Centuries 
 
48 Thomas A. Timberg, “Informal Remittance Systems and Afghanistan,” 
http://www.nathaninc.com/NATHAN/files/CCPAGECONTENT/DOCFILENAME/0000502422/Informal%20Remitta
nce%20Systems%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf (accessed May 2007), 7. 
49 Amit Sharma, Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
50 Thompson, 157. 
51 Ibid., 170. 
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of social memory cannot be erased.  Hawala works in Afghanistan.  Hawala is 
embraced by Islam.  These are facts that should not be ignored but rather 
adroitly leveraged in Afghanistan.  
 
The Afghanistan case study affirms the scholars’ school of thought on hawala.  
The crux of this school of thought rests in the core belief that regulation of 
hawala needs to be tempered with patience, regional collaboration, socio-
economic and cultural sensitivity, and broader formal financial reform.  Hastily 
implementing recommendations and regulation will not benefit the U.S. in its 
long-term efforts to defeat al Qa’ida.  If counter-terror efforts are to curb hawala 
usage by criminal elements without denying its sanctity to legitimate users, then 
reform must address Afghanistan’s rich culture.  Another tenet of the scholars’ 
school of thought is that broader formal financial reform will have a more 
desired effect in reducing hawala misuse than direct external pressure and 
regulation on hawala through registration and licensing.  This case study shows 
that Looney, Passas and Maimbo are correct.  Regulation cannot achieve its 
desired effect without broad and gentle financial reform in all sectors of the 
Afghan economy.  Lastly, as de Gourde emphatically states: you must account 
for the socio-economic and cultural effects of any hawala regulation.  Al Barakaat 
is but one example of regulators not looking ahead and seriously considering the 
cultural second and third order effects of stamping out hawala.  Heavy-handed 
regulation is disastrous.  Afghanistan bears out the preeminence of socio-
economic and cultural impact of poorly designed financial regulation.  
 
Ultimately, the most important truth to glean from Afghanistan is the utter 
inefficacy of any reform that does not include the hawaladars themselves in the 
creative process.  Due to the social constraints, business practices and history of 
self-regulation, it is imperative to have hawaladar support in any regulatory 
measures.  Less than full endorsement and collaboration in regulatory legislation 
or enforcement will doom any such measures to failure.  Trust must be earned.  
However, the government can reach out to hawaladars over time, heeding their 
advice, and slowly nudging them to the formal sector incrementally. 
 
There seems to be a belief that universal regulation, blunt tools such as the 
PATRIOT ACT, EO 13224, or those offered in the FATF special recommendations 
are going to ubiquitously act as penicillin for the incongruities and faults of 
hawala networks throughout the world.  This is false and a disastrous cognitive 
pretext for reform. 
 
It is a mistake to over-regulate hawala, and to the extent that it must be 
regulated, the greatest cultural deftness must be employed.  If the U.S. is to curb 
Islamic “extremism” and jihadism in the “war on terror” than it absolutely 
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cannot afford to continue offering an olive branch to moderate Muslims even as 
it wields a blunt and deadly financial hammer in the other hand. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
